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HMRC sanctions

Beyond the Loan Charge: Will the most recent proposals finally shut down disguised remuneration schemes?

24th April 2023 by Dr Pete Sproat
  • In 2016 Chancellor George Osborne declared the introduction of the loan charge would “shut down disguised remuneration schemes”.
  • Yet HMRC estimates 31,000 people used such schemes in 2020-21, resulting in a loss of £400m in tax.
  • The authorities have attempted to address the demand and supply of such schemes, using mainly administrative and civil penalties.
  • While tens of thousands face the loan charge, few enablers have faced hurtful sanctions.
  • Fewer than six financial penalties for enabling defeated tax avoidance schemes have been issued since 2017.
  • Fewer than five investigations into disguised remuneration tax avoidance schemes resulted in a criminal charge since 2017.
  • Recent proposals are unlikely to shut down the disguised remuneration schemes anytime soon.

In the recent Spring Budget the government proposed to consult on a new criminal offence for those who fail to comply with a legal notice from HMRC to stop promoting a tax avoidance scheme1. This is welcome news, for the latest official estimates suggest that in 2020-2021, approximately 31,000 people were still using such schemes, and the UK lost £400m in tax as a result2. A staggering 99% of the tax avoidance market3 involves disguised remuneration (DR) – contrived arrangements that use schemes which use loans, annuities, shares or other valuables to make allegedly non-taxable payments in lieu of wages. Hospital workers constitute the largest group who are involved in such schemes today4. Many do not know they are participants in such schemes – at least until later when HMRC demand the tax owed. Others are unaware of HMRC’s view these schemes do not work5.

However, in terms of penalties it has been the users, not those promoters and enablers of unsuccessful schemes, who have been the most heavily penalised, most notably in the form of the Loan Charge imposed upon 50,000-100,000 people6. Introduced in the Finance Act 2017, the controversial policy places an income tax charge on the value of outstanding ‘loans’ on 5th April 2019 held by people who used disguised remuneration schemes. As originally drafted, the charge applies to any ‘loan’ entered into since 1999. In the 2016 Spring Budget speech, then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne declared the introduction of the loan charge would: “Shut down disguised remuneration schemes”7. It is clear that his prediction has yet to come true.

Action taken

Over the past two decades, the authorities have correctly attempted to address both sides of the tax avoidance problem. In terms of demand, legislative changes have required the earlier payment of tax in dispute, as well as the loan charge. HMRC has been gathering lots of information about the tax avoidance market and this has enabled it to try to nudge and prompt the public into compliance, using emails, blogs, webpages, dedicated agent services and a helpline8.

The collection of information has also facilitated HMRC’s attempts to deal with suppliers of schemes operating outside of the spirit of the laws on tax. Thus, tax advisers have been required to disclose details of their avoidance schemes promptly under the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes (DOTAS) regime since 2004. However, while this enabled HMRC to identify many potential problems more quickly, within a decade the government felt the need to introduce the Promoters of Tax Avoidance Schemes (POTAS). It empowered HMRC to impose conditions on the behaviour of: “a small number of promoters who operate in a culture of non-disclosure, non-co-operation and secrecy”9. It also enabled the issuing of notices to promoters to stop them from selling schemes that had been defeated.10 Since then, HMRC has been authorised to impose financial penalties upon any enablers involved in the managing, marketing, designing or financing of defeated, abusive tax arrangements that were entered into on or after 16 November 2017.

HMRC has introduced, or supported, new codes of behaviour including its own Standard for Agents (2016), and the tax and accountancy professions’ Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation (2013), and it reports tax advisors to their professional bodies. In addition, it can suspend tax agents’ access to its systems, or refuse to deal with any who seriously abuse the tax system11. HMRC frequently litigates civil action in tax tribunals, and occasionally it takes action against tax evaders and the promoters of tax avoidance schemes in criminal courts.

As a result of these changes and legal decisions, the nature and focus of disguised remuneration schemes have changed over the last decade or so. A HMRC policy paper states: “their creation and promotion have moved to the more disreputable and shadier end of the market”12. These days, marketed avoidance schemes almost always involve employer businesses and “umbrella” companies engaging larger numbers of contractors or agency workers, operating arrangements which falsely claim to reduce Pay As You Earn and National Insurance Contributions. Umbrella companies can provide a legitimate business structure and services for contractors, but in some instances, they facilitate avoidance schemes.

Currently, HMRC estimate there are around 70 to 80 non-compliant umbrella companies in operation13. This is no improvement on its suggestion there were 60 to 80 of these operating14 in 2019-20. Similarly, each of its recent reports on the marketing of disguised remuneration schemes note about 20 to 30 promoter organisations: “are behind most of the tax avoidance schemes that are marketed to the UK public”15. The fact that as many new promoters and companies have entered the market in recent years as have left, suggests HMRC’s actions have failed to shut down disguised remuneration schemes. One result is the authorities have proposed or introduced, even more changes in the last few years.

 

Will the latest approaches defeat disguised remuneration schemes?

Recent ideas to reduce demand include; publishing a guide to help contractors engaged through umbrella companies, greater cooperation between HMRC and the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), and listing promoters and enablers of tax avoidance schemes in the hope recipients of their advice will leave these schemes.

However, it is difficult to suggest these will have more than a marginal impact on the demand side. It is incredibly optimistic to expect most contractors to read official guides, or the newly employed to walk away if they find out they are paid in an unusual manner16.Similarly, even if the enablers are ‘named and shamed’ contemporaneously – presently it can take years to be listed, and names are removed from the list after 12 months – it is unrealistic to assume tens, if not hundreds of thousands of temporary workers will conduct regular checks on those who pay them A slight decrease in the number of deceptive adverts may mean some people do not fall for the schemes. The ‘naming and shaming’ list may also have a marginal impact on the supply side, in that some potential enablers may not risk the listing of reputation, or may fear being reported to their professional body as a result.

Interestingly, it was a listing on 18th August 2022 that triggered TaxWatch’s examination of Gateway Outsource Solutions and its complaint to the ICAEW about its director Paul George Ruocco17. However, while better contact with professional bodies may deter a few potential suppliers, these days promoters are almost never members of the professional bodies – as HMRC itself noted18. This then takes us on to consider other recent approaches to address the supply side.

To address the problems arising from the non-cooperation, delaying tactics by those promoting tax avoidance schemes and their dissipation of assets in order to avoid fines, the DOTAS and POTAS regime has been toughened to allow HMRC to obtain information from promoters earlier than in the past. The Finance Act 2022 authorised HMRC to apply for freezing orders when it has a good arguable case there may be a dissipation of assets to prevent the imposition of a tax penalty. It also enabled the organisation to petition a court to wind-up companies operating against the public interest. This can include persistent non-compliance with anti-avoidance rules, or a repeated failure to respond to HMRC’s requests for information19.

To address the problem of ‘phoenixism’ – the re-birth of a company by people involved in one that has been dissolved in order to avoid tax obligations – the government amended legislation to allow POTAS obligations to be transferred to other scheme-promoting entities controlled by the same individuals. To facilitate this, HMRC proposes better cooperation with the Insolvency Service. It has also suggested giving relevant cases to the Financial Conduct Authority. Finally in this regard, the government introduced legislation which allows HMRC to impose a new penalty on UK-based entities that assist the activities of offshore promoters. In general, these people are more difficult to deal with because of the complex nature of schemes and the UK’s reliance on the authorities elsewhere. The value of the new penalty on the UK promoter can be as high as the total fees earned by all those involved in the development and sale of that tax avoidance scheme – potentially including fees paid directly to the offshore promoter, and any other entities or persons who formed part of the ‘promotion structure’ for the scheme.20

These moves are a step in the right direction, in particular the stiff financial penalties facing UK-based entities in league with overseas promoters contained in the Finance Act 2022. However, to produce a sudden step-change HMRC needs to implement all of these approaches – especially the tougher ones – at speed and at scale. Unfortunately, this seems unlikely.

For example, HMRC has had the ability to charge an enablers penalty since 2017. However, it requires the scheme use to be defeated and an opinion from the General Anti Abuse Rule (GAAR) panel. The first opinion of the panel in respect of an enablers’ penalty was published in October 2022. In addition, while it has been possible to obtain freezing orders and winding-up orders for almost a year, not one of either21 had been obtained by the time we spoke to HMRC in March 2023. This suggests each process either takes a long time or HMRC did not have targets in mind when the legislation was introduced.

The speed at which various sanctions and financial penalties can be imposed by HMRC is unlikely to increase anytime soon. This is because the number of cases outstanding at the First-tier Tax Chamber has increased by 52% to 45,000 in the last year – primarily, as a result of it receiving a high number of cases and the time it takes to decide each22.

The scale of implementation is important for if enablers are to be deterred, they need to believe there is a good chance they will face a strong sanction. This seems unlikely, given HMRC has not implemented the tougher sanctions at scale in the recent past.

It did make 75 professional interest disclosures for any breach of its Standards for Agents to professional bodies23 between 2018-19 and 2021-22, but this is will have little impact given most promoters are not members. HMRC has ‘named and shamed’ 27 promoters of tax avoidance schemes24 as of 23rd March 2023. While we will not find out the impact of this until next year, it is unlikely to put a stop to the problem of mass-marketed avoidance schemes given HMRC’s belief new companies continue to join this illicit market as others leave.

As for the use of sanctions that have a greater chance of deterring, HMRC has issued fewer than six financial penalties for enablers of defeated tax avoidance schemes25 since 2017. Similarly, it opened only 15 criminal investigations in relation to arrangements that it categorised as disguised remuneration tax avoidance schemes between 1st April 2017 to 8th March 2023. Of these, fewer than five progressed to a charging decision or resulted in a criminal conviction26. Surely, this is a major reason the number of promoters has remained the same in recent years?

As for the ideas in the recent budget, the idea of expediting the disqualification of directors of companies involved in promoting tax avoidance is unlikely to be a game-changer for disqualified directors can simply find others to front their companies. The proposal to prosecute those who refuse to stop promoting schemes is more promising – especially if it contains strong sanctions including imprisonment. However, even if it is proposed the new law will cover schemes in operation now, it is unlikely to be applied at the appropriate scale anytime soon. The consultative and legislative processes take a while, and not everything gets through it – as advocates of compulsory professional indemnity insurance for tax advisers will remember. Similarly, the proposal could be shelved afterwards – as happened recently to the plan to create a single enforcement body to monitor the treatment of employees by umbrella companies and others.

Unless HMRC decides to change its criminal investigation efforts from focusing on “very serious evasion and organised crime”27, the number of enablers prosecuted is unlikely to change dramatically. In sum, he main reasons the number of promoters is not declining is because enforcement action takes too long, many of the actions are weak and stronger sanctions are rarely applied. What needs to happen is for HMRC to use its wide-ranging set of powers – including criminal investigations – at speed and at scale. Perhaps then the government will be able to do what George Osborne’s loan charge failed to do, shut down disguised remuneration schemes. Hundreds of millions of pounds a year in lost tax revenue are at stake.

This story was featured in The Times

 

1 Spring Budget 2023, HM Government, 15 March 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spring-budget-2023/spring-budget-2023-html

2 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the UK (2020 to 2021), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk-2020-to-2021

3 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the UK (2020 to 2021), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk-2020-to-2021

4 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the UK (2020 to 2021), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk-2020-to-2021

5 Tax avoidance loan schemes and the loan charge, HMRC, updated 9 February 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/loan-schemes-and-the-loan-charge-an-overview/tax-avoidance-loan-schemes-and-the-loan-charge . For a more detailed discussion of the law with regards to tax avoidance see TaxWatch’s briefing: Is Tax Avoidance Legal? Available from: http://13.40.187.124/is_tax_avoidance_legal/

6 Ray McCann, President of the Chartered Institute of Taxation in answer to Q.105. Oral Evidence: The conduct of tax enquiries and resolution of tax disputes, House of Common Treasury Sub-committee, HC 733, 10 December 2021, https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasury-subcommittee/the-conduct-of-tax-enquiries-and-resolution-of-tax-disputes/oral/93722.html

7 Budget 2016: George Osborne’s speech, Gov.uk, 16 March 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/budget-2016-george-osbornes-speech

8 Managing tax compliance following the pandemic: HM Revenue & Customs. SESSION 2022-23. National Audit Office. 16 December 2022. HC 957. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/managing-tax-compliance-following-the-pandemic-report.pdf

9 HMRC Investigations Handbook 2016/17 (Bloomsbury, 2017), M. McLaughlin, (ed). p147

10 New powers for HMRC: fair and proportionate? House Of Lords, Economic Affairs Committee, 19 December 2020, p11.

11 Raising standards in the tax advice market, HMRC, 10 March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/raising-standards-in-the-tax-advice-market-hmrcs-review-of-powers-to-uphold-its-standard-for-agents

12 The Rt Hon Jesse Norman MP, the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury in: Tackling promoters of mass-marketed tax avoidance schemes, HMRC, updated 23 March 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tackling-promoters-of-mass-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes

13 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the UK (2020 to 2021), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk-2020-to-2021

14 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the UK (2020 to 2021), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk-2020-to-2021

15 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the UK (2020 to 2021), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk-2020-to-2021

16 In addition, Meredith McCammond of the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group suggested: “The list will also do nothing for those who may have little choice to be paid by a non-compliant umbrella company if they want the work.” ‘HMRC adds three AML schemes to its tax avoidance blacklist’, Contractor, Simon Moore, 31st January, 2023, https://www.contractoruk.com/news/0015769hmrc_adds_three_aml_schemes_its_tax_avoidance_blacklist.html

17 Director of suspected HMRC tax avoidance scheme continues to be member of professional body, TaxWatch, 02 Februart 2023, http://13.40.187.124/hmrc_name_shame_complaint/

18 Use of marketed tax avoidance schemes in the |UK (2018 to 19), HMRC, updated 30 November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk/use-of-marketed-tax-avoidance-schemes-in-the-uk

19 Clamping down on promoters of tax avoidance: summary of responses, HMRC, updated July 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/clamping-down-on-promoters-of-tax-avoidance/outcome/clamping-down-on-promoters-of-tax-avoidance-summary-of-responses

20 Clamping down on promoters of tax avoidance: summary of responses, HMRC, updated July 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/clamping-down-on-promoters-of-tax-avoidance/outcome/clamping-down-on-promoters-of-tax-avoidance-summary-of-responses

21 According to a spokesperson from HMRC, 13 March 2023.

22 Tribunal Statistics Quarterly: July to September 2022, Ministry of Justice. 8 December 2022, Section 8. www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tribunal-statistics-quarterly-july-to-september-2022/

23 During the period 2018-19 to 2021-22. HMRC FOI2022/72035, 05 December 2022.

24 According to a spokesperson from HMRC, 14 March 2023.

25 FOI2023/12152, HMRC, 23 March 2023. HMRC used a legal exemption in the Freedom of Information legislation to avoid providing a more precise answer.

26 FOI2023/08373, HMRC. 08 March 2023. HMRC used a legal exemption in the Freedom of Information legislation to avoid providing a more precise answer.

27 Jim Harra, Chief Executive and First Permanent Secretary, HMRC, in answer to Q 176. The Work of HMRC, Oral Evidence. House of Commons Treasury, 30 November 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/11972/html/

 

Differing approaches to combating marketed tax avoidance schemes

7th June 2022 by George Turner

Taxation magazine recently carried an article from our Executive Director looking at HMRC’s record on tackling marketed tax avoidance schemes over the last 10 years. The article looks at the differing results HMRC has achieved going after two different types of tax avoidance scheme and what lessons can be drawn. The text of the article can be found below. A pdf is available here: A_tale_of_two_avoidance_schemes_-_Taxation,_

  • In 2013, there were in effect two marketed tax schemes – sideways loss relief and disguised remuneration.
  • Several court decisions ruled that sideways loss relief schemes were ineffective from a tax law perspective.
  • There have been criminal prosecutions of people who operated these schemes.
  • HMRC has won two cases – Rangers and Aberdeen Asset Management – on disguised remuneration and that was on the PAYE argument.
  • The loan charge has helped promoters with the argument that nothing was wrong until HMRC changed the law retrospectively

The tax avoidance industry has been through a remarkable transformation over the past decade. Ten years ago, there were only two tax avoidance schemes that were sold to individuals in any volume: sideways loss relief schemes and disguised remuneration schemes. According to HMRC figures, in the 2013-2014 tax year 35% of all users of tax avoidance schemes – 8,500 people – were members of sideways loss relief schemes. Today that figure is zero. Over the same period, disguised remuneration has flourished. There were 13,200 people involved in disguised remuneration in 2013-14, but this has risen to 28,000 in 2019-20, the latest year when figures are available. Why is it that HMRC has been so comprehensively successful at combating one form of tax avoidance, while demonstrably failing to deal with another?

Respectable end of the avoidance market

In an appearance before the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee last year, Jim Harra, HMRC chief executive, offered one explanation: ‘The situation with the promotion of tax avoidance is over recent years, we feel we’ve been very successful at driving the respectable end of the tax profession out of offering tax avoidance.’ Clearly, we have come a long way since David Hartnett described sideways loss relief schemes as ‘schemes for scumbags’.

In 2013, there were in effect two marketed tax schemes – sideways loss relief and disguised remuneration. Several court decisions ruled that sideways loss relief schemes were ineffective from a tax law perspective. There have been criminal prosecutions of people who operated these schemes. HMRC has won two cases – has won two cases Asset Management – on disguised remuneration and on disguised remuneration and that was on the PAYE argument.was on the PAYE argument. The loan charge has helped promoters with the argument that nothing was wrong until HMRC changed the law retrospectively.

In particular, HMRC points to the code of practice on taxation for banks (large banks were frequently involved in providing the finance for sideways loss relief schemes), and the tightening of professional conduct rules for accountants and tax advisers in 2017, which in effect made it a disciplinary offence to sell a mass-marketed tax avoidance scheme. The implication is that more senior professionals subject to professional regulation were successfully persuaded to get out of selling the schemes to their clients. Although it is the case that sideways loss relief schemes were mainly targeted at high net worth individuals – the kind of people that employ professional accountants and lawyers and are clients of private banks – sideways loss relief schemes are not a form of tax avoidance defined by the involvement of professional advisers. It is well known that many senior lawyers signed off on disguised remuneration schemes, senior accountants operated and sold the schemes, and former HMRC inspectors regularly pop up as being involved with disguised remuneration. In fact, it was recently confirmed that an accountant that acts for the royal family is one of the more significant players in the field of disguised remuneration. If it really is the case that improvements in professional standards have driven out the respectable end of the avoidance market, why have allegedly respectable people continued to market disguised remuneration schemes? The simple answer is that codes of practice and professional ethics will only ever take us so far. That is not to say that improving professional standards is unimportant. It is, but sadly there will always be morally vacuous people in every profession who will seek to make a profit from taking advantage of others. In the end, the most effective way of stopping any form of tax avoidance is to establish that a scheme is unlawful with regard to tax law. As Lord Templeman put it many years ago: ‘Every tax avoidance scheme involves a trick and a pretence. It is the task of the Revenue to unravel the trick and the duty of the court to ignore the pretence.’ It is also important to ensure that dishonest behaviour is challenged, if necessary by way of the criminal prosecution of those that seek to promote dishonest tax avoidance schemes. As it was recently put by Lady Justice Simler and Mrs Justice Whipple in Ashbolt and Arundell v HMRC and Leeds Crown Court [2020] STC 1813 ‘tax avoidance moves from lawful conduct to criminal conduct when it involves the deliberate and dishonest submission of false documents to HMRC with the intent of gain by the taxpayer in question and loss to the public revenue’. When we analyse the performance of HMRC in both the civil and criminal courts, it is here where we see a real difference in performance with regard to different forms of tax avoidance.

Sideways illusion

Sideways loss relief schemes worked in the following way. Investors, who were always high earners with large income tax liabilities, entered into a partnership that was formed on the pretence of carrying out some form of trade. To encourage potential clients into the arrangements, often, scheme designers based them around well-known tax reliefs, marketing the scheme as a government-supported initiative. Film schemes such as Eclipse and Ingenious are perhaps the most well-known examples, but there were also schemes that invested in vaccine research or reforestation and green energy. However, almost any investment could be used to claim sideways loss relief, such as the well-known Working Wheels scheme based on the used car industry, and some lesser-known schemes investing in computer software. The expenditure incurred in the trade would result in losses which were used to reduce the income tax liabilities of the partners under the sideways loss relief rules. The trick was that these losses were inflated by circular financing arrangements which meant that the tax write-off ended up being multiples higher than the amounts of real cash put in by clients of the scheme. The effect of this inflation also meant that the majority of capital raised by the partnerships would never actually be spent on the trade itself. For example, in Vaccine Research Limited Partnership Scheme v CRC [2015] STC 179, the partnership claimed to have spent £114m on developing various vaccines, when in fact only £14m had been spent on research and development with the balance being paid in fees to the scheme operators and the banks that had funded the contributions of partners in the first place. HMRC disallowed the claims for tax relief for partners of sideways loss relief schemes, arguing that to qualify, expenditures had to be incurred for the purposes of a trade, and the partnerships needed to operate on a commercial basis.

Even though the schemes contained some commercial element which meant that it was theoretically possible for them to earn a profit, the inflation of losses made the prospect of any profit actually being made in the long term wholly unrealistic, undermining any idea that the partnerships were a commercial enterprise. As Judge Colin Bishop put it in his First-tier Tribunal decision in the Icebreaker case Acornwood and others (TC3545): ‘A 14-handicap golfer may set out on the first tee with the aim and hope of going round the course in par; but he could have no reasonable expectation of doing so.’ The courts were generally supportive of HMRC’s arguments, and there followed a long line of cases where various sideways loss relief schemes were defeated. This includes TowerM Cashback, Working Wheels, Eclipse, Ingenious and Vaccine Research. In some cases, HMRC started criminal proceedings. According to HMRC, since April 2016, 22 people have been convicted of ‘offences relating to arrangements that have been promoted and marketed as tax avoidance’. A review of HMRC press releases reveals that at least 20 of these individuals were involved in sideways loss relief schemes.

In these cases there was usually some aggravating factor which attracted the attention of HMRC’s criminal investigators. For example, in the case of R v Michael Richards and others, it was found that a sizeable chunk of the money that was supposed to have been invested in reforestation projects was being siphoned off into secret Swiss bank accounts for the personal benefit of the scheme operators. However, it is also remarkable that in at least some cases, the core elements of the offences prosecuted by the crown were the very basis on which sideways loss relief schemes operated. In his sentencing remarks following the conviction of four individuals behind the Little Wing film scheme Judge Drew described the ‘cheat’ as: ‘Submitting tax returns which contained false statements about the LLP’s allowable losses. They were false because the jury found as a fact either that the expenditure was not wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the LLP’s trade, or the trade was not carried out on a commercial basis.’ He may not have been aware of it at the time, but Judge Drew, in summarising the guilty act of a serious criminal offence, was in effect describing how all sideways loss relief tax avoidance operated. Something which must have at least given some promoters pause for thought.

Legal confusion

HMRC has not had the same success when it comes to disguised remuneration schemes. Many of these arrangements involve the creation of an offshore employee benefits trust. A company employing an employee or contractor would place funds into the trust, which would then be loaned to the employee. The trust might also provide some other benefit, such as a gift of shares in a company controlling a bank account full of cash. The scheme promoters argued that because the trust was independent of the company and that the loan was in theory repayable, then it should not be counted as income for tax purposes. The reality however, was that the trust always paid the loan and never asked for the money back. Both employers and employees regarded the money as income for the employee to keep.

Early attempts by HMRC to deny the benefit of schemes to taxpayers were met with opposition from the judiciary. In two cases that went before the Special Commissioners in 2000s, Dextra Accessories (SpC 331) and Sempra Metals (SpC 698), the judges found that loans granted by the employee benefit trust were not taxable income. In both cases the government decided not to appeal the point on income tax. In 2013 the Court of Session accepted HMRC’s argument that Aberdeen Asset Management v CRC [2014] STC 438 should have withheld income tax under PAYE for payments made to employees made through an employee benefit trust. HMRC won on the same argument again at the Court of Session in Murray Group Holdings v CRC [2016] STC 468, defeating the Rangers employee benefits trust scheme. In that case the judges was scathing of the rulings of the tax tribunals, which until then had found in favour of Rangers, saying:

‘The fundamental principle that emerges from these cases appears to us to be clear: if income is derived from an employee’s services qua employee, it is an emolument or earnings, and is thus assessable to income tax, even if the employee requests or agrees that it be redirected to a third party. That accords with common sense… This principle is ultimately simple and straightforward – indeed, so straightforward that in cases where elaborate trust or analogous relationships are set up it can easily be overlooked. That, it seems to us, is what happened before the First-tier and Upper Tribunals in this case.’

The Court of Session decision was later confirmed by the Supreme Court (RFC 2012 plc (formerly known Rangers Football Club plc) v Advocate General for Scotland [2017] STC 1556). Both the Court of Session and the Supreme Court found that Sempra and Dextra had been wrongly decided. However, although the Rangers case established beyond any doubt that the payments made to an offshore trust in relation to employment should be considered earnings and taxed as such, campaigners rightly point out that the case does not establish that employees in disguised remuneration schemes should be liable to pay the tax themselves. This was recognised by Jim Harra himself, in an email unearthed through a freedom of information request where he expresses frustration that he has been unable to obtain a legal analysis to back HMRC’s position that individuals are taxable on earnings received via a disguised remuneration scheme. One key difference between the findings of the civil courts in cases involving sideways loss relief and disguised remuneration, is that by removing the benefit of tax relief from the partners, the courts have taken away all the incentive for investors to participate in these schemes. With disguised remuneration, without a judgment that establishes that scheme users are liable for any tax bill, the incentive for an employee to take part in the scheme remains. Employees will care little if a scheme means that they reduce their tax bills, whilst their employer runs the risk of being hit with a tax bill in the future. This is in fact how some disguised remuneration schemes have played out, with organisations like the BBC agreeing to pay off the tax liabilities of freelancers engaged through tax avoidance schemes.

Limitations of legislative fixes

The most significant intervention the government has made against disguised remuneration has been the loan charge, a piece of legislation that attempts to ensure that people historically involved in disguised remuneration schemes are subject to taxation without the need to raise an enquiry into the scheme or a taxpayer’s returns.

However, in the absence of any decision of a court establishing that the users of loan based remuneration schemes had any tax liability at all, the use of legislation to enforce HMRC’s view of the existence of that liability has proved highly problematic. Inevitably, it has been interpreted by many people as demonstrating that disguised remuneration was at the time a lawful means of reducing a tax on the part of an individual taxpayer, which a defeated HMRC has been forced to attack with retrospective legislation, something which goes against every principle of justice in this country. The perception that the loan charge is an unjust act of a vengeful administration has pushed scheme users into the arms of promoters of loan charge avoidance schemes. As a policy designed to draw a line under disguised remuneration the loan charge has been a complete failure. Participation in disguised remuneration schemes increased substantially between the announcement of the loan charge in 2016, and its implementation in 2019.

Learning lessons

By looking at the history of litigation in both the civil and criminal courts, the answer to the question, why has HMRC been much better at tackling sideways loss relief schemes than disguised remuneration, is obvious. Through careful, painstaking litigation HMRC have managed to establish the principle that sideways loss relief schemes are not only ineffective in tax law, rendering the whole enterprise pointless for scheme users, but that the promotion and operation of these schemes could be regarded a cheat on the revenue, ending with a period of incarceration at her Majesty’s pleasure. It is little wonder that the use and promotion of these schemes has stopped entirely. Until now at least, HMRC have not been able to establish the same with regards to disguised remuneration. As recently confirmed by the financial secretary to the Treasury, the number of people that have been the subject of a successful criminal prosecution is precisely zero. Despite a barrage of legislative remedies, the practice continues to operate. This may soon be about to change. HMRC recently disclosed for the first time that it currently has 17 people under active criminal investigation for ‘offences relating to arrangements promoted as disguised remuneration tax avoidance schemes’. The only investigation where details have emerged publicly, Operation Skeet, is connected with alleged attempts by Paul Baxendale Walker’s firm (or its successor) to rebrand loans so that they fell outside the scope of income tax and the loan charge. In judicial review proceedings the Court of Appeal upheld search and seizure warrants issued against two individual users of these schemes whom it suspected of offences of fraud by false representation and cheating the public revenue (see Ashbolt and Arundell v HMRC and Leeds Crown Court [2020] STC 1813). On the civil litigation side, HMRC points out that it still has thousands of open enquiries into users of disguised remuneration schemes, some of which may still come before the tribunal.

One case currently before the Court of Appeal, Hoey v CRC, deals directly with the issue of whether HMRC has the right to tax an employee, and not the employer, in a disguised remuneration scheme, one of the biggest legal issues yet to be resolved. If HMRC is successful in bringing a series of civil and criminal cases against disguised remuneration schemes, we could see the practice go the same way as sideways loss relief. But do not expect that to happen anytime soon. HMRC first opened its enquiry into the tax returns of Rangers Football Club in 2004, yet it was not until 2017 that the Supreme Court finally resolved the case in favour of HMRC. In 2005 HMRC opened an enquiry into Carbon Trading Positive Ltd, which finally ended in the conviction of Michael Richards and his co-conspirators in 2017. In that case it took seven years to bring the case to trial after the defendants had been charged. There were long-running disputes over disclosure and, at one point, a High Court judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process, only for them to be re-instated at the Court of Appeal. The trial itself took 11 months. One of the jurors managed to conceive and give birth to a child during the course of it.

Justice delayed is justice denied

The old saying of justice delayed is justice denied was never more true than with disguised remuneration. The decisions of the tribunals in Dextra, Sempra and Rangers meant that for the best part of ten years, the tax tribunals supported an interpretation of the law that was later found by the superior courts to be wrong. In the interim, thousands of people were brought into disguised remuneration schemes having been reassured by senior lawyers and accountants that the structures they were entering into were perfectly legal. Had the tribunal’s interpretation of the law been corrected more quickly, many thousands of people may have been spared the stress and anxiety arising from their involvement in a tax avoidance scheme. What the story of disguised remuneration demonstrates beyond any doubt is that the pitifully slow progress of tax disputes is a source of real injustice and an issue that needs to be addressed.

This article was originally featured in Taxation Magazine

A blank page - HMRC's list of large corporate tax dodgers

Threat to “name and shame” aggressive tax dodgers fails to bite, new stats show

29th October 2019 by George Turner

A government pledge to name and shame aggressive tax avoiders has failed to list a single company, new research by TaxWatch has revealed.

In 2016, as part of the Government’s crackdown on tax dodging Parliament put in place a set of measures designed to improve the behaviour of large corporations.

The new rules would allow HMRC to put companies onto the naughty step if they had been found to be persistently non-compliant. This was defined as persistently failing to disclose information requested by HMRC, or being a serial abuser of tax avoidance schemes.

Being placed into “special measures” could potentially have serious consequences. Companies could be named and shamed, or have a strict liability for any inaccuracies in their tax returns.

Despite saying that the measure was only targeted at a small number of bad apples, officials at HMRC clearly had high hopes that the measure would have an impact. When the government first consulted on introducing the measure in 2015 it penciled in an additional £40m a year in tax being raised. Another initiative that was introduced at the same time, the requirement to publish tax strategies, was predicted to raise an additional £65m.

By the time that it was announced in the 2016 budget, estimates of its effectiveness had ballooned to over half a billion pounds a year, with both measures scheduled to bring in an additional £625m in tax in the 2020/2021 tax year.

TaxWatch asked HMRC how many companies had been put into special measures since the introduction of the large corporate naughty step in 2016. The answer? Zero.

In a response to a Freedom of Information request, HMRC told TaxWatch that the threat of special measures had been so terrifying that the small number of companies considered for action immediately mended their ways, thus leading to no action being required. They told us:

The High Risk Corporates Programme, a key part of HMRC’s code of governance for resolving tax disputes, aims to simultaneously resolve tax risks and change customer behaviour. As part of this programme, special measures sanctions have been considered in a small number of cases where our large businesses demonstrate persistently uncooperative behaviours and engage in aggressive arrangements. Subsequent improvements in customers’ behaviour have removed the need to impose sanctions on these particular cases.

It is worth remembering that sanctions would only be put in place if companies had already been persistently non-compliant. The public might expect that giving large companies one final warning before taking action may be an act of leniency not usually available to other groups of people that have to deal with HMRC.

This research was featured in Private Eye, Law360 and Accountancy Daily.

Photo by Ashley Edwards on Unsplash


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